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FIDUCIARY DUTIES AND UNINCORPORATED
BUSINESS ENTITIES: IN DEFENSE OF THE
"MANIFESTLY UNREASONABLE" STANDARD

Mark J. Loewenstein*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Much ink has been spilled discussing the fiduciary duties of participants in
unincorporated business entities, principally partnerships and limited liability
companies. 1 As the law of unincorporated business entities has moved from statute to
contract, 2 the debate has shifted from the content of fiduciary duties to whether the
* Nicholas A. Rosenbaum Professor of Law, University of Colorado School of Law. The author thanks
J. William Callison, Deborah A. DeMott, and J. Dennis Hynes for helpful comments on an earlier draft of this
article, and research assistants Andrew LaFontaine, Hannah Wanebo, and Richard Murray.
1. Some recent articles include: J. William Callison & Allan W. Vestal, The Want of a Theory, Again, 37
Suffolk U. L. Rev. 719 (2004) (critiquing the Uniform Limited Partnership Act because it lacks a coherent
theory to explain the allocation of participant management and information rights and fiduciary duties);
J. William Callison, Blind Men andElephants: FiduciaryDuties under the Revised Uniform PartnershipAct,
Uniform Limited Liability Company Act, and Beyond, 1 J. Small & Emerging Bus. L. 109, 159 (1997)
(critiquing the contractarian approach of the Revised Uniform Partnership Act); J.Dennis Hynes, Freedom of
Contract, FiduciaryDuties, and Partnerships:The Bargain Principleand the Law ofAgency, 54 Wash. & Lee
L. Rev. 439 (1997) [hereinafter Hynes, Freedom of Contract] (arguing for freedom of contract in partnership
agreements); J. Dennis Hynes, Fiduciary Duties and RUPA: An Inquiry into Freedom of Contract, 58 L. &
Contemp. Probs. 29 (1995) [hereinafter Hynes, Fiduciary Duties] (arguing for unrestrained freedom of
contract); Sandra K. Miller, The Role of the Court in Balancing Contractual Freedom with the Need for
Mandatory Constraints on Opportunistic and Abusive Conduct in the LLC, 152 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1609 (2004)
(arguing for judicial intervention to address abusive conduct); Allan W. Vestal, Advancing the Search for
Compromise: A Response to ProfessorHynes, 58 L. & Contemp. Probs. 55 (1995) (responding to Hynes and
arguing for limitations on freedom of contract). For a view that partners are fiduciaries only in narrow
circumstances, see Larry E. Ribstein, Are PartnersFiduciaries?2005 U. Ill. L. Rev. 209 (2005) [hereinafter
Ribstein, Partners];Larry E. Ribstein, FiduciaryDuties and Limited PartnershipAgreements, 37 Suffolk U. L.
Rev. 927 (2004) [hereinafter Ribstein, FiduciaryDuties]. For an opposing view that would expand fiduciary
duties, see Claire Moore Dickerson, From Behind the Looking Glass: Good Faith,FiduciaryDuty & Permitted
Harm, 22 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 955 (1995), see also Tammy Savidge Moore, Student Author, The Policy of
Opting-out of Fiduciary Duties in a Limited Liability Company: McConnell v. Hunt Sports Enterprises, 42
S. Tex. L. Rev. 183 (2000) (arguing for a "reasonableness" limitation on waivers of fiduciary duty); Larry E.
Ribstein, Fiduciary Duty Contracts in UnincorporatedFirms, 54 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 537, 540 (1997)
[hereinafter Ribstein, Fiduciary Duty Contracts] (arguing that fiduciary duties "are simply a species of
contract" and that restrictions on waivers of fiduciary duties cannot be justified); Eric Talley, Taking the 7'Out
of 'Team': Intra-Firm Monitoring and the Content of FiduciaryDuties, 24 J. Corp. L. 1001 (1999) (arguing
that high fiduciary duties induce excessive monitoring).
2. Several sections of the Uniform Partnership Act of 1914, 6 U.L.A. 275 (2001), are expressly made
"subject to any agreement [between the partners]." E.g. § 18 (rights and duties of partners in relation to the
partnership), § 19 (place where partnership books shall be kept), § 25 (right to possess partnership property),
§ 27 (effect of an assignment of a partnership interest), § 37 (right to wind up the partnership), § 40
(distribution of property after dissolution), § 42 (rights of a retired partner and the estate of a deceased partner),
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parties forming these entities should be free to disclaim such duties altogether.
Ironically, the relevant statutes-the Uniform Partnership Act of 1914 ("UPA"), 3 the
Revised Uniform Partnership Act of 1997 ("RUPA"), 4 the Uniform Limited Liability
Company Act of 1996 ("ULLCA"), 5 and the Uniform Limited Partnership Act of 2001
("ULPA") 6 -suggest the debate is moving in the opposite direction, inasmuch as UPA is
virtually silent on mandatory fiduciary duties, 7 while the three later Acts include
mandatory fiduciary duties. 8 UPA, however, was drafted against the background of
agency law that recognized fiduciary duties in the principal-agent and partner-partner
relationship, 9 so the paucity of provisions in UPA mandating fiduciary duties should not
be interpreted to mean that such duties were not part of the relationship of the parties.
Indeed, as demonstrated below, the structure of UPA suggests that these duties were
inherent in the relationship, while the modem acts (RUPA, ULLCA, and ULPA) were
intended to replace common law fiduciary duties with statutory provisions. 10 Moreover,
§ 43 (right to an account of the interest of a partner). This drafting technique suggests that other terms
(including § 20 and § 21, which impose fiduciary duties on partners) are mandatory. In contrast, the Revised
Uniform Partnership Act § 103, 6 U.L.A. 1 (2001), the Uniform Limited Liability Company Act § 103,
6A U.L.A. 553 (2003), and the Uniform Limited Partnership Act § 110, 6A U.L.A. 1 (2003), provide that all
provisions, with a few specified exceptions, are default terms.
3. 6 U.L.A.275 (2001).
4. 6 U.L.A. 1 (2001).
5. 6A U.L.A. 553 (2003).
6. 6A U.L.A. 1 (2003).
7. Historically, partnerships were considered mutual agency relationships, with fiduciary duties of loyalty
and care owed from each partner to every other partner. UPA captured this concept, providing in § 4 that the
laws of agency apply and in § 9 that "[e]very partner is an agent of the partnership for the purpose of its
business." UPA did not codify the fiduciary duties of a partner, likely because its drafters may have felt that it
was not necessary to do so, as these agency concepts were so widely known and accepted. Only UPA § 20 and
§ 21 relate to fiduciary duties, with the former setting forth a disclosure requirement and the latter providing
that
[e]very partner must account to the partnership for any benefit, and hold as trustee for it any profits
derived by him without the consent of the other partners from any transaction connected with the
formation, conduct, or liquidation of the partnership or from any use by him of its property.
The comment states why the drafters included § 21: they wanted to make clear that a partner holds partnership
property as a trustee so that the partnership could pursue traceable partnership assets in the hands of a partner
as a beneficiary of a trust rather than as an ordinary creditor of the partnership. The section thus clarified some
doubts arising from existing case law and thereby provided some protection to a partnership against the
misconduct of a partner. There is no official comment to § 20; however, it appears likely that the purpose of
this section was to make clear that not only partners have a right to information on demand, but so does the
legal representative of any deceased partner or partner under legal disability. Indeed, it is somewhat inaccurate
to characterize UPA § 20 as setting
forth the duty of disclosure, as the common law duty of disclosure is
broader than set forth in § 20. See Appletree Square I LP v. Investmark, Inc., 494 N.W.2d 889, 892-93 (Minn.
App. 1993) (noting that fiduciary duty of disclosure is broader than the duty to render information on demand).
The drafters' decision to forgo codification of core fiduciary duties in UPA only emphasizes how ingrained
those duties were.
8. See RUPA § 404; ULLCA § 409; ULPA § 408.
9. UPA § 4 provides that "[tihe law of agency shall apply under this act." See Alan R. Bromberg, Crane
and Bromberg on Partnership390 (West 1968) (suggesting that lawmakers adopting UPA understood that it
incorporated common law fiduciary duties); Robert E. Mathews & Justin H. Folkerth, Ohio PartnershipLaw
and the Uniform PartnershipAct, 9 Ohio St. L.J. 616, 661-62 (1948) (noting the same with respect to Ohio
law); Byron D. Sher & Alan R. Bromberg, Texas PartnershipLaw in the 20th Century--Why Texas Should
Adopt the Uniform PartnershipAct, 12 Sw. L.J. 263, 298-300 (1958) (noting the similarities between Texas
common law and the UPA); see also infra n. 33 and accompanying text.
10. See Alan W. Vestal, Fundamental ContractarianError in the Revised Uniform PartnershipAct of
1992, 73 B.U. L. Rev. 523, 532 (1993) (commenting that RUPA was intended "to displace, and not merely to
supplement, the common law." (footnote omitted)).
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unlike UPA, the later Acts anticipate that parties will seek to bargain out of fiduciary
duties and expressly provide considerable freedom to do so. 11 By comparison, many

courts interpreting UPA expressed skepticism when it came to enforcing fiduciary
waivers. 12 Finally, several states, led by Delaware, have adopted post-RUPA provisions
that expand on the freedom of contract provided in RUPA. 13 Bar association and state
legislative committees around the country are now, or shortly will be, considering
whether to amend their statutes on unincorporated business entities to permit parties, as
Delaware has, 14 to disclaim fiduciary duties entirely. This article seeks to inform their
deliberations.
The idea of freedom of contract is attractive. After all, why should parties dealing
at arm's length not be free to craft any sort of arrangement that they desire, inasmuch as

no third parties are adversely affected by their deal? 15 Enforcing agreements as written,
it is argued, will increase their certainty and reliability. 16 Presumably, the courts will
serve as a safety net if the bargain struck meets the stringent requirements of
unconscionability, but aside from that the courts should enforce the bargain as written.
Advocates of a robust application of freedom of contract, sometimes called
"contractarians," support their view with economic analysis, arguing that freely struck
bargains are more economically efficient than bargains that include terms mandated by a
17
state statute.
Arrayed against the contractarians are those that believe that partnerships and

limited liability companies are not solely contractual entities; rather, the participants
have some moral obligation to one another, an obligation that ought not to be totally
eliminated by agreement. 18 Adherents of this view, sometimes called "fiduciarians,"

11. See RUPA § 103; ULLCA § 103; ULPA § 110; infra pt. III.
12. See infra pt. lI.B.
13. See e.g. Ga. Code Ann. § 14-9-108(b)(1) (2003), which provides:
The partner's duties and liabilities may be expanded, restricted, or eliminated by provisions in the
partnership agreement; provided, however, that no such provision shall eliminate or limit the
liability of a partner for intentional misconduct or a knowing violation of law or for any transaction
for which the partner received a personal benefit in violation or breach of any provision of the
partnership agreement.
Presumably, under this provision, the partnership agreement could provide for the elimination of the duty of
loyalty.
14. Del. Code Ann. tit. 6, § 15-103(f) (2005). The Virginia partnership statute allows waiver of the duty of
loyalty by omitting that duty from the provisions that cannot be altered by agreement. Va. Code Ann.
§ 50-73.81 (B) (2005); see also supran. 13 (discussing the Georgia statute).
15. See Hynes, Freedom of Contract, supra n. 1, at 443.
16. Id. There is some evidence suggesting that certainty and reliability are not being realized, even in
Delaware. See Jack B. Jacobs, Entity Rationalization:A Judge'sPerspective,58 Bus. L. 1043, 1044-46 (2003)
(noting the exceptionally large volume of litigation in Delaware involving unincorporated business entities).
17. See Ribstein, FiduciaryDuty Contracts, supra n. 1, at 541-45; see generally Frank H. Easterbrook &
Daniel R. Fischel, The Economic Structure of Corporate Law 1-39 (Harv. U. Press 1991); Frank H.
Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Contractand FiduciaryDuty, 36 J.L. & Econs. 425 (1993).
18. See e.g. Dickerson, supra n. 1; Tamar Frankel, FiduciaryDuties as Default Rules, 74 Or. L. Rev. 1209,
1246 (1995) ("t believe that like every civilized society, we must provide a legal model of a trust relationship.
Broad and sweeping waivers of fiduciary duties that could undermine such a trust model should not be
enforced."); C.A.E. Goodhart, Economics and the Law: Too Much One-Way Traffic? 60 Modem L. Rev. 1, 14
(1997) (arguing that a law and economics approach improperly elevates economic efficiency over justice and
equity); see also e.g. Vestal, supra n. 1; Donald J. Weidner, RUPA and Fiduciary Duty: The Texture of
Relationship, 58 L. & Contemp. Probs. 81 (1995).

TULSA LA W RE VIEW

[Vol. 41:411

support their view with theories based on imperfections in the bargaining process, the
reasonable expectations of the parties, and the need to police against overreaching and
sharp practices. On this view, parties
are unable to predict what abuses might be
19
committed by an opportunistic partner.
While the law is evolving in the direction favored by the contractarians, it is
clearly not there yet, at least outside of Delaware and a few other states. Rather, the
modem acts have struck a middle ground that seems to be widely accepted-parties can
contract around fiduciary duties, but not completely. The modem acts generally provide
that the parties can limit certain fiduciary duties so long as the limitation is "not
manifestly unreasonable." 2° This middle ground, discussed in Part III below, has been
subject to criticism from both sides of the debate, with contractarians arguing that its
drafters have not gone far enough, and fiduciarians, predictably, that the drafters have
gone too far in the direction of contractarians.
While I am sympathetic to the contractarian view as a theoretical matter, for
pragmatic reasons I support the middle ground represented by the modem acts. In short,
courts traditionally have been leery of deferring to the agreement that parties strike when
unfairness seems palpable. In those instances, courts will imply strained rules of
interpretation to reach a "just" result. They will employ, in the words of a great
twentieth-century legal scholar, "covert tools" 2 1 to reach the end that they desire. 22 The
19. See e.g. Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract, 47 Stan. L.
Rev. 211, 249 (1995). Professor Eisenberg argues that limitations on the cognition of beneficiaries of fiduciary
duties suggest that at least some waivers should not be enforced by the courts:
To begin with, because of bounded rationality the beneficiaries could not possibly identify all the
varying circumstances to which a general waiver of the duty of loyalty would apply. Furthermore,
the beneficiaries would likely be unduly optimistic about the extent to which the manager would
deal fairly despite the lack of fiduciary restraints. The availability and representativeness heuristics
would enhance such undue optimism: Beneficiaries would tend to give undue weight to their good
relationship with the manager at the time of contract formation, because that relationship is vivid,
concrete, and instantiated, as compared with the possibility that the manager would exploit the
bargain at some point in the future, which is abstract, general, and pallid, and would tend to
overestimate the extent to which the present relationship with the manager is a reliable index of the
future relationship. Similarly, faulty telescopic faculties would lead the beneficiaries to give undue
weight to the present benefits of the relationship as compared to the future costs of the waiver.
Finally, beneficiaries would tend to underestimate the risks that the waiver entailed. Thus, a general
waiver of the duty of loyalty would inevitably permit unanticipated opportunistic behavior on the
part of managers.
Id.; see also Hynes, FiduciaryDuties, supran. 1, at 44 (citing Professor Eisenberg's challenge to the drafters of
RUPA); but see Robert W. Hillman, Business Partnersas Fiduciaries:Reflections on the Limits of Doctrine,
22 Cardozo L. Rev. 51, 51 (2000) (stating "fiduciary duties are largely ineffective in controlling opportunistic
behavior by business partners" (footnote omitted)).
20. See RUPA § 103; ULLCA § 103; ULPA § 110; infra pt. III.
21. Karl Llewellyn, the principle draftsman of Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC"), wrote
that "covert tools are never reliable tools." Karl N. Llewellyn, Book Review, 52 Harv. L. Rev. 700, 703 (1939)
(reviewing 0. Prausnitz, The Standardization of Commercial Contracts in English and Continental Law
(Sweet & Marshall 1937)). Consistent with that observation, Llewellyn argued that the UCC should deal with
the problem of unconscionability directly, and so it did in § 2-302. See Carol B. Swanson, Unconscionability
Quandary: UCC Article 2 and the Unconscionability Doctrine, 31 N.M. L. Rev. 359, 362 (2001) (noting
§ 2-302 was created to "invit[e] courts to police contracts openly for unfairness instead of using ... 'covert
tools' (footnotes omitted)). Some courts have employed covert tools. See e.g. In re Marriageof Gallagher,
539 N.W.2d 479, 484 (Iowa 1995) (Temus, J., dissenting) (accusing the majority of resorting to covert tools to
avoid addressing a troubling precedent). Some courts eschew covert tools and announce a rather protective or
paternalistic view. For example, Fujimoto v. Au, 19 P.3d 699, 737-40 (Haw. 2001), where the court treated a
limited partnership agreement as a contract of adhesion, thus suggesting that a clause in the agreement that

2006

FIDUCIARYDUTIES AND UNINCORPORA TED BUSINESS ENTITIES

415

middle ground of the modem acts is just about right because it recognizes that
unrestrained freedom of contract will not be wholly successful in the courts and that it is
better to create a standard in advance as to what those limits will be. While one can
quibble with the drafters' choice of terms, and some have,2 3 a recognizable jurisprudence
should develop that will give lawyers drafting these agreements the guidance they need
to assure an enforceable agreement.
The middle ground staked out by the drafters of the modem acts also has
interesting, albeit indirect, judicial support. Looking at a broad swath of cases
considering fiduciary waivers over a number of years reveals an interesting pattern. As a
general matter, when courts rule that a fiduciary waiver is unenforceable, the underlying
equities support the result, and broad language extolling the fiduciary nature of the
parties' relationship is beside the point. On the other hand, when courts enforce a
fiduciary waiver, the opinions invariably note the importance of contractual freedom
when, in fact, the underlying equities generally favor the same outcome. This
jurisprudence thus points to a middle ground, where judicial notions of fairness explain
the outcome as well as, or better than, principles of fiduciary duty or freedom of contract.
Given this jurisprudence, statutory drafters would be well advised to eschew the
contractual freedom reflected in Delaware as, predictably, even the Delaware courts
have
24
been slow to enforce the contractual freedom reflected in the Delaware statutes.
Part II reviews the status of fiduciary duties as they existed prior to the modem
Acts. Part III reviews the innovations of the modem Acts and Delaware. Part III also
examines the meaning, or potential meaning, of the phrase "manifestly unreasonable."
Part IV briefly summarizes the academic debate over freedom of contract in the context
of unincorporated business entities. Part V sets forth a brief conclusion.
In this article, I refer primarily to the statutory provisions and cases decided under
partnership law, inasmuch as many states have modeled their limited liability company
statutes on that law. In addition, I have not distinguished between the fiduciary duties of
a general partner in a general partnership and a general partner in a limited partnership.
As a general matter, the fiduciary duty of a general partner to the limited partnership and

limited the liability of the general partners to acts involving gross negligence and willful misconduct was
unenforceable. Despite the fact that such clauses are common in corporate charters and partnership
agreements, the court seemed offended by the clause in this case. In a line of Texas cases, the courts affirmed
the idea that a partnership is a fiduciary relationship notwithstanding the fact that the Texas version of RUPA
deleted the word "fiduciary" from its version of § 404. See e.g. MR. Champion, Inc. v. Mizell, 904 S.W.2d
617, 618 (Tex. 1995) ("Partners owe each other and their partnership a duty in the nature of a fiduciary duty in
the conduct and winding up of partnership business, and are liable for a breach of that duty." (citation
omitted)); Hughes v. St. David's Support Corp., 944 S.W.2d 423, 425-26 (Tex. App. Austin 1997).
22. See e.g. Edward A. Dauer, Judicial Policingof Consumer Arbitration, 1 Pepp. Dis. Res. L.J. 91, 101
(2000) (the courts have "steadfastly searched for-and found-ways to avoid the Supreme Court's preference
for arbitration, doing everything just short of blatant disobedience" (footnote omitted)); Susan A. FitzGibbon,
Teaching Unconscionability through Agreements to Arbitrate Employment Claims, 44 St. Louis U. L.J. 1401,
1416 (2000) ("One may speculate that the court preferred to adjust the agreement using the more 'covert tool'
of interpretation because the court's conclusion on this point was not inescapable."); Robert F. Nagel, The
Problem with the Court, Natl. Rev. 43, 45 (Nov. 21, 2005) (arguing that "[j]udges... often view the outcomes
of the political process as irrational, unjustifiable, or excessively risky" and thus substitute their own
sensibilities for those of the legislature through various conventions of interpretation).
23. E.g. Callison, supra n. 1, at 158.
24. See infra n. 98 and accompanying text.
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its partners is substantially the same as the duty of a general partner to his fellow general
partners and the general partnership. 25 Finally, this article will focus on the statutory and
contractual provisions relating to the duty of loyalty. The duty of loyalty has generated
the duty of care and implicates more fundamental concerns of
more controversy than
26
contracting parties.
II.

A.

FIDUCIARY DUTIES INUNINCORPORATED BUSINESS ENTITIES

The Uniform PartnershipAct of 1914

UPA, which was approved by the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws in 1914, is a modest statute. Its forty-six sections are not typical of
a modem day business entity statute. Instead of detailed provisions, UPA's drafters
preferred to state broad principles of law, codifying and clarifying the common law of
partnerships. 2 7 On the question of fiduciary duties, the statute is remarkably silent. The
word "fiduciary" appears only once, and then only in the title to § 21: "Partner
Accountable as a Fiduciary." 2 8 That section provides
[e]very partner must account to the partnership for any benefit, and hold as trustee for it
any profits derived by him without the consent of the other partners from any transaction

connected with the formation, conduct, or liquidation of the partnership or from any use by
him of its property.
The comment to this section states that the section was included to make clear that a
partner held partnership profits as a trustee, so that in the event of the partner's
insolvency, "the partnership can claim as their own any property or money that can be
traced." 29 In other words, the purpose of the section was not necessarily to define a
partner's duties to the partnership-that was already clear under the common law-but
to resolve the competing claims of the partnership and creditors of the insolvent partner
when the partner held partnership property.
The only other section of UPA that is fiduciary in nature is § 20, which requires
partners to "render on demand true and full information of all things affecting the
partnership to any partner or the legal representative of any deceased partner or partner

25. Everest Investors 8 v. McNeil Partners,8 Cal. Rptr. 3d 31 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. 2003).
26. For a comprehensive discussion of the duty of care in unincorporated business entities, see Elizabeth S.
Miller & Thomas E. Rutledge, The Duty of Finest Loyalty and Reasonable Decisions: The Business Judgment
Rule in UnincorporatedBusiness Organizations?30 Del. J. Corp. L. 343 (2005).
27. For instance, the drafters clarified the common law in provisions such as UPA § 3, which clearly
defines "knowledge" and "notice," terms that were often confused in common law cases. See William Draper
Lewis, The Uniform PartnershipAct, 24 Yale L.J. 617, 624 (1915). UPA § 8 and § 10 clarified the "existing
confusions surrounding the subject of conveyance of real properly to or by a partnership." Id. UPA § 41
clarified the liability of a new partner to an existing partnership for pre-existing debts, providing, contrary to
some case authority, that the new partner risked only his or her capital contribution and was not personally
liable for the partnership's pre-existing debts. Id. at 636-37. While UPA tweaked the common law, the
drafters expressly rejected the one radical change that was proposed: treating the partnership, for all purposes,
as a separate legal entity, distinct from its partners (the "entity" theory). Instead, the drafters elected to
continue to consider a partnership as an aggregate of the individual partners. Id. at 640-41.
28. UPA§21.
29. Id.at § 21 cmt.
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under legal disability." 30 There is no official comment to this section, and Professor
William Draper Lewis, the reporter for the project, does not mention it in his article
commenting on the Act.3 1 Given the structure of UPA, however, it is unlikely that the
drafters sought solely to define a fiduciary duty here. Rather, as with other sections, this
section was likely intended to clarify a principle of law, probably that a partner's
common law duty of disclosure includes disclosure to a former partner's legal
representatives.
The idea that the drafters of UPA accepted the common law fiduciary duties as
inherent in the partnership relationship is supported by § 9(1) of the Act, which provides
that "[e]very partner is an agent of the partnership." The fiduciary duties of agents to
their principals were fairly well developed by 191432 and clearly included:
a. a duty of loyalty, which includes a duty not to usurp partnership business
opportunities, a duty not to compete with the partnership, and a duty not to act
adversely to the partnership;
b. a duty of care when acting on behalf of the partnership;
c. a duty to act in good faith and deal fairly with one's co-partners; and
d. a duty to disclose to one's co-partners information material to the conduct of the
33
partnership's business.
The common law concept of the fiduciary duties of partners reached its apex in the
1928 case of Meinhard v. Salmon,3 4 discussed below.

30. One might characterize UPA § 22, "Right to an Account," as a section on fiduciary duties. This section
entitles a partner to a formal accounting under certain specified circumstances, including "[wihenever other
circumstances render it just and reasonable." UPA § 22. Referring to this clause, the comment suggests that if
a partner is entitled to an accounting, a "duty" is imposed on the other partners to provide it. Id. at § 22 cmt.
Thus, both UPA § 20 and § 22 impose duties on partners vis-A-vis one another, but it would be inaccurate in
light of traditional usage to refer to these duties as "fiduciary" in nature.
31. Lewis, supran. 27.
32. See id. at 638 (noting "our partnership law [referring to the UPA] is but a branch of the law of agency").
33. For some early agency cases supporting these fiduciary duties, see Pollock v. Skelton, 15 Ga. App. I
(Ga. App. 1914) (duty of loyalty and good faith); Bedford Coal & Coke Co. v. Parke Coal Co., 89 N.E. 412
(Ind. App. 1909) (same); De Hart v. De Hart, 67 A. 1074 (N.J. 1906) (duty of care); Restatement (First) of
Agency § 13 (1933) (duty of loyalty). For early partnership cases, see Whitney v. Dewey, 158 F. 385, 391
(9th Cir. 1907) (loyalty and good faith); Nelson v. Matsch, 110 P. 865 (Utah 1910) (disclosure); see also
Latta v. Kilbourn, 150 U.S. 524, 540 (1893) (duty not to compete). The U.S. Supreme Court in Latta v.
Kilbourn set forth a rather comprehensive statement of a partner's fiduciary duty:
[It is] well settled that one partner cannot, directly or indirectly, use partnership assets for his own
benefit; that he cannot, in conducting the business of a partnership, take any profit clandestinely for
himself; that he cannot carry on the business of the partnership for his private advantage; that he
cannot carry on another business in competition or rivalry with that of the firm, thereby depriving it
of the benefit of his time, skill, and fidelity without being accountable to his copartners for any
profit that may accrue to him therefrom; that he cannot be permitted to secure for himself that which
it is his duty to obtain, if at all, for the firm of which he is a member; nor can he avail himself of
knowledge or information, which may be properly regarded as the property of the partnership, in the
sense that it is available or useful to the firm for any purpose within the scope of the partnership
business.
Id. at 541.
34. 164 N.E. 545 (N.Y. 1928).

TULSA LA W RE VIEW
B.

[Vol. 41:411

Meinhard v. Salmon and its Progeny

Partnership fiduciary duties, which, as noted above, were based on the law of
agency in UPA, were somewhat transformed by the 1928 case of Meinhard v. Salmon.
This case, with its famous dictum by Judge Cardozo that the standard of behavior that
one joint venturer owes to another is "[n]ot honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor
the most sensitive," 3 5 seemed to raise the bar for the behavior of a partner and
particularly so when one considers the facts of the case. Salmon and Meinhard formed a
joint venture 36 to lease and operate certain commercial property in the New York City.
The lease ran for twenty years. Prior to its expiration, Salmon, who was the managing
venturer (Meinhard being a "silent partner"), negotiated an enlargement and extension of
the lease for his own account without consulting Meinhard, who sued and prevailed.
To the extent that the case holds that one partner cannot usurp a partnership
business opportunity, it is an uncontroversial application of the duty of loyalty.
However, the case seems to do more than that. First, Cardozo's broad dictum suggests
that the duty of loyalty is an abstract, boundless duty. Indeed, a less quoted sentence
supports this view: "Salmon had put himself in a position in which thought of self was to
be renounced, however hard the abnegation." 37 Second, this venture was formed to
operate for the length of the lease; arguably, Salmon should have no fiduciary obligation
to further Meinhard's interests beyond that term. Perhaps Meinhardought not to be read
as broadly as Cardozo's dictum suggests because Salmon was managing the venture and,
as such, had a greater duty to Meinhard than he would have had if they been equally
involved in the management of the venture. 38 In any event, the case does announce a
robust concept of fiduciary duty, a concept that has undoubtedly influenced judicial
attitudes towards waivers of fiduciary duties.
1.

Fiduciary Waivers Not Enforced

Meinharddid not discuss the enforceability of waivers or modifications of the high
fiduciary duty that it announced. Its strongly moralistic tone, however, suggests that
waivers would not be sympathetically reviewed by courts operating under UPA and,
indeed, that has been the case, with some exceptions. Several cases are frequently cited
for the proposition that a waiver of a fiduciary duty is not enforceable. 39 While these

35. Id. at 546.
36. Id. at 545-46. A joint venture is a partnership for a limited purpose. All of the rules relating to
partnerships apply to joint venturers. See J. Dennis Hynes & Mark J. Loewenstein, Agency, Partnership,and
the LLC. The Law of UnincorporatedBusiness Enterprises 262 (6th abr. ed., LexisNexis 2003).
37. 164 N.E. at 548. This aspect of Meinhard has been overruled statutorily in jurisdictions that have
adopted RUPA § 404(e), which provides: "A partner does not violate a duty or obligation under this Act or
under the partnership agreement merely because the partner's conduct furthers the partner's own interest."
38. See Wirum & Cash Architects v. Cash, 837 P.2d 692 (Alaska 1992) (describing the duties of a
managing partner); Cronin v. McCarthy, 637 N.E.2d 668, 675 (II1. App. 1st Dist. 1994) ("Where one party is
the senior or managing partner, his obligation to deal fairly and openly and disclose completely is
heightened."); see generally Ribstein, Partners,supra n. I (arguing that Meinhard should be read narrowly to
mandate fiduciary duties only when one partner has broad powers over another's property).
39. Wartski v. Bedford, 926 F.2d 11 (1st Cir. 1991) (applying Massachusetts law); BT-I v. Equitable Life
Assurance Soc. of the U.S., 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 811 (Cal. App. 4th Dist. 1999); Labovitz v. Dolan, 545 N.E.2d 304
(Ill. App. 1st Dist. 1989); Appletree, 494 N.W.2d 889.
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cases seem to turn on the fiduciary nature of a partnership, in fact they generally could
have been decided on narrower grounds. For instance, in Labovitz v. Dolan,4 0 an Illinois
appellate court decision, the limited partnership agreement allocated to the general
partner, the defendant, full management authority and provided that he "in his sole
' 41
discretion shall determine the availability of Cash Flow for distribution to Partners.
The plaintiff alleged that the defendant violated his fiduciary duty by making only
nominal distributions of cash flow, despite significant taxable income, and then sought to
purchase the interests of the limited partners at a thirty-three percent discount from book
value. 4 2 The appellate court, reversing the trial court, found in favor of the plaintiff,
holding
despite having such broad discretion, [the defendant] still owed his limited partners a
fiduciary duty, which necessarily encompasses the duty of exercising good faith, honesty,
and fairness in his dealings with them and the funds of the partnership. It is no answer to
the claim that plaintiffs make in the case that the partners have the right to establish among
themselves their rights, duties and obligations, as though the exercise of that right releases,
waives or delimits somehow, the high fiduciary duty owed to them by the general
partner-a gloss we do not find anywhere in our law. On the contrary, the fiduciary duty
exists concurrently with the obligations set forth in the partnership agreement whether or
not expressed therein. Indeed, at least one of the authorities relied upon by defendants is
clear that although "partners are free to vary many aslects of their relationship
inter se... they are not free to destroy its fiduciary character." 4J
A couple of comments regarding this holding are in order. First, the court did not need
to suggest that the partnership agreement "releases, waives or delimits" any fiduciary
duty, inasmuch as the partnership agreement in question did not, by its terms, expressly
disclaim fiduciary duties. Second, and more importantly, the case could have been
resolved on the narrower ground of contractual good faith. As a matter of general
contract principles, when an agreement assigns a party an exclusive right, that party
cannot use its contract right to disappoint the reasonable expectations of the other
party. 44 If the defendant did not have a legitimate business reason to withhold
distributions to the limited partners, then an implication arises that the defendant was
acting in bad faith. 45 That appeared to be the case here.

40. 545 N.E.2d 304 (I11.
App. 1st Dist. 1989).
41. 1d.at306.
42. Id. at 305.
43. Id. at 310 (citations omitted).
44. See Fortune v. Natil. Cash Register Co., 364 N.E.2d 1251, 1256 (Mass. 1977) (holding that an employer
could not terminate an employee at will for the purpose of avoiding commissions that were earned by, and
would otherwise have been paid to, the employee); Schafer v. RMS Realty, 741 N.E.2d 155, 179 (Ohio App. 2d
Dist. 2000) (holding that a partner's capital call to "squeeze out" co-partner breached fiduciary duty, even if
allowed under the agreement); see generally John D. Calamari & Joseph M. Perillo, The Law of Contracts460
(4th ed., West 1998); Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation, 1988
Duke L.J. 879, 899-901 (1988) (noting that good faith looks to how parties perform their agreement).
45. See e.g. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 205 cmt. d (1981) (including within the concept of "bad
faith" the "abuse of a power to specify terms"). In Labovitz, the general partner had the power to specify the
allocation of cash flow, a power he abused and thus exercised in bad faith. 545 N.E.2d at 313.
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To a similar effect is Wartski v. Bedford,46 where one partner complained that his
co-partner usurped a business opportunity that rightfully belonged to the partnership or
should have been shared with him. The partnership was a shareholder in a corporation
that owned patent rights developed by the plaintiff together with certain other assets.
The corporation was experiencing financial difficulties and the defendant purchased the
corporate securities owned by the outside investors for a nominal sum, thereby enabling
those investors to realize a tax loss. When the corporate assets were subsequently sold
for a substantial amount of money, plaintiff claimed that defendant had breached a
fiduciary duty by usurping the business opportunity. 47 The United States Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit upheld a jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff, affirming the
finding below that the defendant breached his fiduciary duty to the plaintiff by usurping
48
a business opportunity that, in fairness, should have been offered to the partnership.
The appellate court opinion mentions, but does not discuss, an agreement among
the shareholders that prohibited the sale of shares unless the shares were first offered to
the corporation, and if it declined to purchase the shares, to the other shareholders. Thus,
the defendant was contractually obligated to offer to the partnership the shares that he
proposed to purchase. The plaintiff, as one of two general partners, could have protected
his interests by causing the partnership to exercise its right of first refusal. It was
unnecessary, therefore, for the court to even consider fiduciary duty or the corporate
opportunity doctrine. Nevertheless, the court cited Cardozo's dictum and said the
defendant would be held to "the 'punctilio of honor' fiduciary standard. ' 49 In that
context, the partnership agreement, which stated that "General Partners shall not be
prevented from engaging in other activities for profit, whether in research and
development or otherwise, and whether or not competitive with the business of the
partnership," 50 would not be interpreted to permit this conduct. Moreover, the court
said, even if this contract language was susceptible of such an interpretation, the plaintiff
would still prevail, because a partner's fiduciary duty "cannot be negated by the words of
the partnership agreement." 5 1 Again, we see a court condemning a waiver that was not
at issue.
A third frequently cited case is Appletree Square I Limited Partnershipv.
Investmark, Inc.,52 which involved a sale by the defendant general partner of its
partnership interests to the plaintiffs, who were limited partners. The partnership's sole
asset was a building, the structural steel of which was coated with asbestos-based
fireproofing that was deteriorating and releasing fibers. The defendant was allegedly
aware of this problem, but the plaintiffs were not. In the course of negotiating the
transaction, the plaintiffs asked the defendant to provide "'any information that you have
not already sent to us which would be material to our investors' participation in this

46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

926 F.2d 11 (lst Cir. 1991).
Id. at 14-18.
Id. at 22.
Id. at 20.
Id. at 21.
926 F.2d at 20 (citation omitted).
494 N.W.2d 889 (Minn. App. 1993).
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development.' 53 The defendant demurred, saying it did not know what information
would be material to the investors. When the asbestos problem later became known to
the plaintiffs, they sued on several theories, including breach of fiduciary duty. The
defendant cited the partnership agreement which, like ULPA, required the general
54
partner to provide partners with "all information that may reasonably be requested.,
The defendant argued that because plaintiffs did not request information about asbestos,
it acted consistently with its statutory and contractual duties. The Minnesota appellate
court reversed a trial court finding in favor of the defendant, holding that the defendant's
common law fiduciary duty of disclosure, which requires disclosure of all known
information that is material to the affairs of the partnership, superseded the statute and
partnership agreement. 55 As to contractual limitations on fiduciary duties, the court said
that "where the major purpose of a contract clause is56to shield wrongdoers from liability,
the clause will be set aside as against public policy."
As in Labovitz and Wartski, the court in Appletree ventured where it need not have
gone. The plaintiffs asked for all material information related to the building, as they
had a right to do under the statute and the partnership agreement. This defendant refused
to provide it and thus was clearly in breach of the agreement. There is no question that
the asbestos contamination was material and the defendant was allegedly aware of it.
While it may have sought to beg off of its contractual and statutory obligation by
claiming it did not know what would be considered material, this is hardly a defense to
its breach. It would have been a more difficult case if the plaintiffs never asked for the
information, a case the court decided in dicta here. Even then, the case could have been
decided on narrower grounds than breach of fiduciary duty, perhaps fraudulent
57
concealment or intentional misrepresentation.
A fourth frequently cited case is BT-I v. Equitable Life Assurance Society of the
United States,58 which involved the purchase of a mortgage loan on partnership property
by the sole general partner of the partnership. The general partner purchased the loan 59
at
a steep discount and, when the partnership was unable to pay the loan, it foreclosed.
The California appellate court reversed a lower court judgment in favor of the general
partner, holding that the conduct of the general partner breached its fiduciary duty to the
partnership.
The opinion is not a model of clarity and fails to identify what fiduciary
duty the defendant breached. The court cites UPA to the effect that a partner has a
fiduciary duty to account to the partnership for any profits derived by the partner from
transactions connected to the partnership business. 6 1 But the court does not conclude
that this statutory duty was breached in this case, as indeed it could not because no profit

53. Id. at891.
54. Id. at 893.
55. Id. at 892-93.
56. Id. at 893.
57. There is some indication in the case that the statute of limitations may have run on these claims.
494 N.W.2d at 894.
58. 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 811 (Cal. App. 4th Dist. 1999).
59. Id. at 814.
60. Id. at 817-18.
61. Id. at 815.
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was identified as a result of the acquisition of partnership debt. The court does cite two
decisions in other jurisdictions holding that a general partner that acquires a partnership
obligation cannot foreclose on partnership assets, 62 but the facts of those cases are
distinguishable. In one, the court held that the secret acquisition of secured debt of the
partnership was a breach of the partner's disclosure obligation, 63 and in the other that the
purchase violated the limited partners' personal right of first refusal to acquire the
obligation. 64 In BT-I, however, neither of those circumstances was present. Rather, the
court's holding seems to be a visceral reaction to the conduct of the general partner. In
any case, much of the opinion is devoted to discussing the waiver issue, concluding that
the partnership agreement did not permit this conduct and, if it did, the agreement would
not be enforced.
What was objectionable about the conduct of the general partner in BT-1 was that
by acquiring partnership debt, it placed itself in a conflict position; that is, it placed itself
in a position in which it would inevitably either act in a way that was not in the best
interests of the partnership or in a way that would harm its own interests. 65 It is fair to
say that this action violates the partner's duty of loyalty. 66 The partnership agreement
did not in any respect waive the duty of loyalty. The closest provision that was relevant
was one providing that the general partner had broad powers to refinance and restructure
partnership debt, but no obligation to contribute additional funds to avoid a foreclosure.
It is quite a stretch to argue that this provision permitted the general partner to acquire
the debt. Although BT-I is not a case that could have been decided on a narrower ground
than breach of fiduciary duty (assuming the plaintiff prevails), it is another example in
which the court uses expansive language to reject the effectiveness of a waiver that, in
67
fact, is not a waiver at all.
While a careful reading of Labovitz, Wartski, Appletree, and BT-I leaves room for
argument that fiduciary waivers may be enforceable because, arguably, language in the
opinions denying the enforceability of a waiver is dicta, the cases do demonstrate the

62. Id. at 815 (citing Thomas v. Schmelzer, 796 P.2d 1026, 1032-33 (Idaho App. 1990); Ebest v. Bruce,
734 S.W.2d 915, 922 (Mo. App. 1987)).
63. Thomas, 796 P.2d at 1032.
64. Ebest, 734 S.W.2d at 922.
65. RUPA § 404(b)(2).
66. See e.g. Constr. Techniques,Inc. v. Dominske, 928 F.2d 632, 638 (4th Cir. 1991) (commenting that, as a
matter of law, "the situation in which [employee] placed himself when, as part owner of [supplier], he became
an employee of [supplier's] sole customer is a situation in which the presence of adverse interests threatens the
fiduciary relationship between principal and agent"); see generally Restatement (Third)of Agency § 8.03 (6th
tent. draft 2005) ("An agent has a duty not to deal with the principal as or on behalf of an adverse party in a
transaction connected with the agency relationship.").
67. To a similar effect are Triple Five of Minnesota, Inc. v. Simon, 280 F. Supp. 2d 895 (D. Minn. 2003)
and Tri-Growth Centre City, Ltd. v. Silldorf Burdman, Duignan & Eisenberg, 265 Cal. Rptr. 330 (Cal. App.
4th Dist. 1989). In Triple Five, the "waiver" in question was a clause that provided that no partner could be
found liable to another partner absent fraud or gross negligence. 280 F. Supp. 2d at 901. This clause did not
limit the complaining partner's claim for improper usurpation of a business opportunity or breach of the duty of
disclosure. Id. In Tri-Growth, the waiver allowed partners in a real estate partnership to acquire property that
competed with property owned by the partnership. 265 Cal. Rptr. at 332 n. 12. The court held that this
provision did not allow a partner to acquire property that the partnership was seeking to acquire. Id. at 336-37;
see also Lyall v. Grayco Builders, Inc., 180 A.D.2d 7, 15 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dept. 1992) (holding that
partnership agreement that partners could participate in other projects did not allow usurpation of partnership
opportunity).
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influence of Meinhard. More importantly, they support the observation that when courts
deny the enforceability of a fiduciary waiver, other factors or the underlying equities
support the outcome. Because the focus of the opinions, however, is on the fiduciary
aspects of the relationship of the parties, these and other cases 68 demonstrate the
continuing importance of fiduciary duties and suggest that courts will view waivers
skeptically, at best. It is fair to speculate that these courts would also read narrowly a
statutory provision that permitted waiver. This is the subject of Part III below. The next
section considers cases in which courts operating under UPA have enforced fiduciary
waivers. With respect to these cases, we might ask whether this represents a different
judicial philosophy, or whether something else explains the outcome. In any event, cases
upholding fiduciary waivers are, to some extent, the mirror image of those that deny
enforcement: When courts enforce a fiduciary waiver, the equities of the case generally
support the outcome and judicial language embracing contractual freedom is, for that
reason, somewhat superfluous.
2.

Fiduciary Waivers Enforced

A wonderful example of these cases is Sonet v. Timber Company, LP.69 Under the
partnership agreement, the general partnership had sole discretion to decide upon, and
recommend to the limited partners, the terms of a conversion, or merger. The limited
partners alleged, among other things, that notwithstanding this broad grant of power, the
general partner owed to the limited partners the default fiduciary duties set forth in the
Delaware Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act.70 The court framed the issue as,
"what controls the governance process in the context of limited partnerships-the
partnership agreement or common law fiduciary duty doctrines?" 7 1 The court resolved
this issue with a forceful statement that "the unambiguous terms of the partnership
agreement have the effect of limiting the court's review of the transaction presently in
dispute." 72 Later in the opinion, the court restated its holding with a statement that
seemed to embrace freedom of contract with little opportunity for future attack on the
principle: "Thus, I think it a correct statement of the law that principles of contract
preempt fiduciary principles where the parties to a limited partnership have made their
73
intentions so plain."

68. E.g. Triple Five, 280 F. Supp. 2d at 901-02 (holding that provision in partnership agreement that
partners would only be liable for "fraud or gross negligence" would not negate claim for breach of fiduciary
duty because agreement cannot destroy the fiduciary nature of a partnership relationship); Fujimoto, 19 P.3d
at 741 (providing exculpatory clause relieving the general partner from vicarious liability held unenforceable as
inconsistent with UPA); Knopke v. Knopke, 837 S.W.2d 907, 915 (Mo. App. 1992) (unqualified managerial
authority subject to fiduciary duty); Schafer, 741 N.E.2d 155 (holding that actions taken consistent with
partnership agreement subject to fiduciary duties).
69. 722 A.2d 319 (Del. Ch. 1998).
70. Id. at 321. Plaintiff alleged that the terms of the conversion were unfair to the limited partners. The
limited partners had a right to vote on the transaction, but had not yet done so at the time of the lawsuit. While
not stated by the court, apparently the plaintiffs sought some sort of injunctive relief.
71. Id.at 320.
72. Id.(footnote omitted).
73. Id. at 322.
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On its face, then, this case would seem to overcome the residual effect of
Meinhard and the whole notion of non-waivable fiduciary duties. However, a few
aspects of this case are worth noting. First, while the partnership agreement granted the
general partner "sole discretion" to recommend the terms of the conversion, the deal
required the approval of sixty-six percent of the limited partners. Second, the case was
brought before the limited partners had voted; indeed, the proxy statement had not yet
been distributed.7 4 Thus, the court may have determined (although it did not so state)
that the plaintiffs' claims were not yet ripe for adjudication. If the limited partners fail to
approve the deal, the complaint becomes moot. On the other hand, if the proxy
statement did provide full disclosure (and the court noted that the plaintiff did not
complain about the adequacy of disclosure 75) and if the limited partners then approved
the transaction, the equities would seem to lie with the general partner. All the court
decided in this case was that the limited partners could protect themselves: "[T]heir
remedy is the ballot box, not the courthouse." 76 While there would be some measure of
judicial review had this involved a corporate merger in which the directors had a conflict
of interest similar to that of the general partner, that review would be limited to
determining whether the plaintiffs demonstrated that the terms of the transaction were so
"unequal as to amount to a gift or waste of corporate assets," 77 a rather difficult burden
for a complainant to satisfy. In short, this was an easy case to announce an embrace of
freedom of contract; plaintiff had little, if anything, to complain about.
While Sonet is a relatively easy case to fit into the rubric, the well-known case of
Singer v. Singer78 poses a challenge. Singer involved a family partnership engaged in oil
production. Two of the partners (the defendants) purchased, for their own account, real
property that at least one of the plaintiff partners previously had indicated the partnership
might have an interest in purchasing. The plaintiffs sought a constructive trust and
prevailed in the trial court. On appeal, the appellate court reversed, relying, in part, on
this provision in the partnership agreement:
Eachpartnershall be free to enter into business and other transactionsfor his or her own
separate individual account, even though such business or other transaction may be in

conflict with and/or competition with the business of this partnership. Neither the
partnership nor any individual member of this partnership shall be entitled to claim or
receive any part of or interest in such transactions, it being the intention and agreement that
any partnerwill be free to deal on his or her own account to the same extent and with the
same force and effect as if he or she were not and never had been members of this
79
partnership.

74. 722 A.2d at 327.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 326.
77. Fliegler v. Lawrence, 361 A.2d 218, 221 (Del. 1976); see also R.S.M. Inc. v. Alliance Capital Mgt.
Holdings LP, 790 A.2d 478, 498 (Del. Ch. 2001) (noting that "the ratification vote obviates any generalized
fairness inquiry"); In re General Motors Class H Shareholders Litig., 734 A.2d 611, 616 (Del. Ch. 1999)
("Because the shareholders were afforded the opportunity to decide for themselves on accurate disclosures and
in a non-coercive atmosphere, the business judgment rule applies, and the plaintiffs must, to avoid dismissal,
plead that the [complained of transactions] were wasteful." (citation omitted)).
78. 634 P.2d 766 (Okla. Civ. App. 1981) (internal quotation marks omitted).
79. Id. at 768 (emphasis in original).
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Singer seems to embrace a very robust view of contractual freedom, 80 allowing partners
to compete with the partnership and thus enforcing a waiver of a fundamental aspect of
the duty of loyalty. The case should not, however, be read so broadly. Interestingly, the
claim was not brought by the partnership. Rather, the plaintiffs were partners other than
the defendants who sued on a theory that the plaintiffs, the defendants, and certain others
(the Trachtenbergs) had formed an oral partnership to exploit opportunities in the area
where the purchased real estate was located. If true, plaintiffs would avoid the waiver.
The appellate court found the proof of this oral partnership lacking, 81 but by pursuing
this theory, the plaintiffs seemed to have weakened their case. The Trachtenbergs, who
were allegedly partners in this oral partnership, denied that such a partnership existed
and did not participate in the case. 82 This evidence likely added to the negative view
that the court had of the plaintiffs. Moreover, defendants' actions were not truly
competitive with the partnership. It is not the case that the defendants, by pursuing oil
production on the disputed property, would in any way jeopardize the business of the
partnership. Finally, the opportunity to purchase the real estate may not have been
deemed to be a "partnership opportunity." 83 The partnership would likely to have to
raise additional capital to acquire and exploit the opportunity.
In effect, a new
partnership would have to be formed if any of the partners did not wish to participate or
chose to participate at a reduced level of participation.
Other cases are to a similar effect-apparently embracing full contractual freedom,
but not posing the issue starkly. 84 Consider, for instance, the well-known case of
McConnell v. Hunt Sports Enterprises,85 which involved a limited liability company that
was formed to acquire and operate a professional hockey franchise in Columbus, Ohio.
The promoter of the venture became discouraged when the city's voters failed to approve
a sales tax measure to fund a new stadium and he refused (albeit without consulting the
other members of the company) to agree to private financing. Some members of the
limited liability company then formed a new group to seek the franchise with that same
private lender. In litigation that followed, the promoter claimed that the new group
improperly competed with the limited liability company, a claim that required an
interpretation of this provision of the operating agreement:

80. See Hynes, FiduciaryDuties, supran. 1,at 41-43.
81. Singer, 634 P.2d at 770.
82. Id. at 771 n. 12.
83. Professors Bromberg and Ribstein suggest that "[t]he court may reach the same result without an
explicit agreement by holding that the narrow scope of the partnership permitted outside dealings." Alan R.
Bromberg & Larry E. Ribstein, Bromberg and Ribstein on Partnershipvol. I1,
§ 6.07, 6:90-:91 (Aspen L. &
Bus. 1994).
84. For example, see Exxon Corp. v. Burglin, 4 F.3d. 1294 (5th Cir. 1993), a case in which the general
partner, purchasing limited partners' interests, did not disclose confidential information regarding oil reserves
on partnership property, as it was permitted to do under the partnership agreement. This posed the issue as to
whether the waiver of the fiduciary duty to disclose would be enforceable, and the court held that it was.
However, here the selling limited partners had other options to acquire the information, and the general partner
had an independent business justification for not disclosing the information. Under these circumstances, the
court held that the defendant-general partner did not breach a fiduciary duty. Like the Sonet case, the language
of the case embraces a robust view of freedom on contract, although the equities independently favored the
party that depended on the contract provision.
85. 725 N.E.2d 1193 (Ohio App. 10th Dist. 1999).
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Members May Compete. Members shall not in any way be prohibited from or restricted in
engaging or owning an interest in any other business venture of any nature,
including any
86
venture which might be competitive with the business of the Company.
The Ohio appellate court affirmed a lower court decision that, in light of the
operating agreement of the limited liability company, the members in the new group did
not violate their fiduciary duties to the limited liability company. The opinion included
predictable language on the freedom to contract: "[A] contract may define the scope of
fiduciary duties between parties to the contract." 87 The court never acknowledged that,
in light of the behavior of the promoter, the members of the new group were perfectly
justified in pursuing the franchise. Due to the promoter's conduct, the original venture
was essentially defunct and it had, at best, only a theoretical interest in pursuing a
franchise. Indeed, the court affirmed the dismissal of a claim for tortious interference
with business relations brought by the promoter because, in short, the limited liability
company had no expectation of obtaining a franchise because it rejected private
88
financing.
Suppose, however, that the facts of McConnell were slightly different and that the
original limited liability company and the new group both actively pursued a franchise in
direct competition with one another. Would the court have ruled the same way? With
these assumed facts, a court would more closely scrutinize the contract language and
might well conclude that the relevant provision that permitted competition "in other
business ventures" meant only that members could own, say, a basketball franchise with
a season that overlapped the hockey season, but did not permit competition for the same
hockey franchise. It is easy to imagine a court saying that it is unlikely that the parties
anticipated direct competition for the very opportunity that the limited liability company
was organized to pursue and if the parties had that intent they would have expressed it
more clearly.
That a court would consider construing a competition waiver narrowly, to prohibit
competition for the same opportunity, is well illustrated by Tri-Growth Centre City,
Ltd. v. Silldorf Burdman, Duignan & Eisenberg.89 In this case, a limited partner,
knowing that the partnership was interested in acquiring a parcel of property adjacent to
the partnership property, acquired the property by agreeing with the seller to an
accelerated closing date. When the partnership sued, seeking a constructive trust, the
limited partner defended on the basis of a provision in the private offering memorandum
stating that any partner could "acquire other real property interests adjacent to or
competing with the Partnership real property" and a provision in the partnership
agreement that allowed any partner to "acquire other real property which competes,
directly or indirectly, with the Property of this Partnership." 9° After concluding that,
under the circumstances, the defendant-limited partner owed a fiduciary duty to the
partnership, the court determined that the fiduciary waiver did not excuse the defendant's

86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Id. at 1206 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 1215.
Id. at 1217.
265 Cal. Rptr. 330 (Cal. App. 4th Dist. 1990).
Id. at 332 n. 2 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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conduct because the limited partner used confidential information in acquiring the
property. 9 1 The only information the partner used, however, was the partnership's
interest in the property. Moreover, the fiduciary waiver in the partnership agreement
(together with the offering memorandum) seemed to have expressly contemplated that
which took place in this case. There is no other explanation why the offering
92
memorandum expressly mentions acquisition of adjacent property.
Interestingly, Tri-Growth does not reach the question as to whether the fiduciary
duty waiver is unenforceable because it negates the fiduciary nature of a partnership.
Rather, the court opted for a reading of the provision that avoided the question. It seems
fair to conclude that even a Delaware court confronted with that situation, or the
hypothetical based on McConnell, would reach the same result.
When faced with difficult case on the equities, Delaware courts seek an equitable
solution. In Werner v. Miller Technology Management, LP,93 for instance, a recent case
before the Delaware Chancery court, the issue was whether plaintiffs self-dealing claim
against the general partner was barred by the partnership agreement, which provided that
"[a]n action may not be commenced by any Limited Partner under this Agreement unless
brought within six months after the actions or circumstances giving rise to such cause of
action have occurred.", 94 Plaintiff argued that this provision did not apply, because his
claim was not one "under this Agreement."
The court agreed, giving a narrow
interpretation to the limitation provision. Arguably, the claim did arise under the
agreement, since the relationship of the parties, and any duties that the defendant had to
the plaintiff, arose only because of their contractual relationship.
Indeed, in Elf Atochem North America, Inc. v. Jaffari,9 5 a case decided by the
Delaware Supreme Court four years before Werner, the Court decided that an arbitration
clause applied to the plaintiff's claim for breach of fiduciary duty, construing "under this
agreement" broadly to capture breaches of fiduciary duty. The plaintiff sought to
maintain a derivative action on behalf of a limited liability company against the manager
of the company. The arbitration provision was in the operating agreement, to which the
limited liability company was not a party. 96 On that basis, the plaintiff argued that the
limited liability company was not bound to arbitrate the dispute. The Court rejected that
argument, reasoning that the parties to the operating agreement wanted all of their
disputes to be subject to arbitration. Similar reasoning in Werner would have barred
plaintiff's claim.
It is obviously easier for a court to order arbitration than to sanction direct
competition by a fiduciary. The Werner court implicitly acknowledged the effect of

91. Id. at 336.
92. In addition, if a partner did not know that the partnership was seeking to acquire that parcel, a court
would likely not characterize that partner's conduct as competition with the partnership.
93. 831 A.2d 318 (Del. Ch. 2003).
94. Id. at 332 (internal quotation marks omitted).
95. 727 A.2d 286 (Del. 1999).
96. Delaware has since amended its law to make clear that a limited liability company is bound by the
operating agreement. Del. Code Ann. tit. 6, § 18-101(7) (2005) ("A limited liability company is bound by its
limited liability company agreement whether or not the limited liability company executes the limited liability
company agreement.").
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equitable considerations in its choice of interpretations: "[I]n the absence of a clearly
expressed contractual provision to the contrary, this court will apply normal equitable
limitations principles." 97 Werner is thus a classic example of a court resorting to covert
tools-here a questionable rule of interpretation-to reach an equitable result. Delaware
courts have read other partnership provisions narrowly to reach equitable results. 98 In
the corporate arena, the Delaware courts have shown a willingness to rely on the
(non-waivable) obligation of good faith to address a claim of breach of the duty of care, a
duty that had been waived in the articles of incorporation. 99 The truly difficult cases-

97. 831 A.2d at 333.
98. See e.g. Gelnan v. Weeden Investors, LP, 859 A.2d 89, 111-12 (Del. Ch. 2004) (providing that
partnership agreement protecting decisions of the general partner "so long as such.., decision [was] not
reasonably believed by the General Partner to be inconsistent with the overall purposes of the Partnership" was
constrained by concepts of fiduciary duty (footnote omitted)); Solar Cells, Inc. v. True North Partners,L.L.C.,
2002 WL 749163 at **4-6 (Del. Ch. Apr. 25, 2002) (providing that despite contract provision in which
noncontrolling partner waived conflicts of interest on behalf of controlling partner, court imposed entire
fairness test on controlling partner to justify merger in which controlling partner had conflict of interest);
see also VGS, Inc. v. Castiel, 2000 WL 1277372 at *4 (Del. Ch. Aug. 31, 2000). In Castiel, the court,
expressly relying on equitable maxims, found a fiduciary duty between managers of a limited liability
company. In light of that fiduciary duty, a written consent of the two managers agreeing to a merger of the
limited liability company with a second entity would be set aside, despite a statutory provision in Delaware that
allowed action by less than unanimous written consent. The Vice Chancellor asserted:
The General Assembly never intended, I am quite confident, to enable two managers to deprive,
clandestinely and surreptitiously, a third manager representing the majority interest in the LLC of an
opportunity to protect that interest by taking an action that the third manager's member would
surely have opposed if he had knowledge of it. My reading of § 18-404(d) is grounded in a classic
maxim of equity--"Equity looks to the intent rather than to the form."
Id.
A Delaware court that limited the reach of a statutory provision in light of general equitable provisions
may well do the same with a contractual provision. Moreover, one could characterize the default provisions of
the limited liability company statute, which governed in this case, as no more than the terms incorporated into
the parties' operating agreement. On that level, then, the court is simply failing to enforce the operating
agreement. As to the claim that the defendants' fiduciary duty to the plaintiff was also a term incorporated into
the operating agreement and it applied in this case, one should note that the defendants did not breach a
fiduciary duty to the limited liability company, but rather to a fellow manager. The court provided no support
for the novel idea that a manager of a limited liability company owes a fiduciary duty to a fellow manager.
Undoubtedly, the conduct of the defendants was troubling, but, except for the intervention of equitable
doctrines, clearly legal. When a court finds that a contractual waiver of a fiduciary duty is manifestly
unreasonable, it is, simply, refusing to enforce a contract on equitable grounds, exactly what the court did
in Castiel.
Another recent case demonstrating the equitable tendency of the Delaware Chancery Court is Haley v.
Talcott, 864 A.2d 86, 98 (Del. Ch. 2004). This case involved an attempt by a fifty percent owner of a limited
liability company to obtain judicial dissolution of the limited liability company, on the grounds of deadlock,
over the objections of his co-owner, who argued that the limited liability company operating agreement
included an exit provision that precluded judicial dissolution. Id. at 87-88. The court sided with the plaintiff
because under the exit provision, plaintiff would still be liable on a mortgage that he had personally guaranteed.
The court thus concluded that it was not "equitable to force [the plaintiff] to use the exit mechanism in this
circumstance." Id. at 98. The exit provision was unconditional and, aside from equitable considerations, the
court cited no reason why the provision should not apply under the circumstances. While noting the
contractual nature of a limited liability company, the court interestingly failed to enforce the agreement of the
parties. Id.
99. See e.g. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 825 A.2d 275, 287-91 (Del. Ch. 2003); see generally
Mark J. Loewenstein, The Quiet Transformation of Corporate Law, 57 S.M.U. L. Rev. 353, 371-73 (2004)
(discussing In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig.). My view of the Disney case-that it is a breach of care
case disguised as a good faith case-is an admittedly cynical one, not shared by all scholars. See e.g. Hillary
A. Sale, Delaware'sGood Faith, 89 Cornell L. Rev. 456, 487-88 (2004) (characterizing the Disney case as one
in which the Disney directors abdicated their responsibilities to the company's CEO and that abdication meant
that they did not act in good faith); see also E. Norman Veasey, Musings from the Center of the Corporate
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cases involving disparate bargaining power, a fiduciary duty waiver, harm to the weaker
party, and a holding that affirms contractual freedom-are yet to appear in the
reporters. 100 Against this background, I now turn to the approach of RUPA, which some
10 1
critics view as limiting contractual freedom.

III. THE INNOVATIONS OF MODERN ACTS AND THE DELAWARE STATUTE
(INCLUDING A DISCUSSION OF THE "MANIFESTLY UNREASONABLE" STANDARD)
A.

The Statutory Provisions

In contrast to UPA, RUPA is a large and complex statute, with numerous defined
terms and sixty substantive provisions, many of which are quite detailed. Not content
with the common law of fiduciary duties for agents and partners, RUPA's drafters
departed from UPA's approach. Section 404(a) of RUPA makes clear that a partner's
fiduciary duties are limited to a duty of loyalty and a duty of care.102 Subsections (b)
and (c) then specify what those duties consist of, roughly tracking the duties of loyalty
and care recognized at common law. 103 While good faith is not listed as a fiduciary
duty, subsection (d) makes clear that the duty does apply, albeit not as a fiduciary duty.
Subsections (e) and (f) modify the duty of loyalty, with (e) stating that a partner does not
violate a duty merely because the partner's conduct "furthers the partner's own
interests," and (f) providing that a partner may transact business with the partnership on
104
the same basis as non-partners.
The partners' duties, fiduciary or otherwise, as set forth in § 404, are subject to
contractual modification, within these limitations set forth in § 103(b) of RUPA:

Universe, 7 Del. L. Rev. 163, 171 (2004) ("That the chancellor's decision on the motion to dismiss last year in
[Disney] was not a mere gross negligence case but an alleged breach of good faith case is clear to me on the
facts."). On the other hand, it is worth noting that Disney represents the rare use of the good faith concept, a
use that focused on the process (or lack thereof) employed by the board to approve an allegedly excessive
employment contract. Because the Disney charter precluded director liability for breach of the duty of care,
plaintiffs' case hinged on convincing the court that they had alleged something more than a care violation.
Under those circumstances, it is unsurprising that the court was persuaded that a good faith violation had been
alleged. See also In re Abbott LaboratoriesDerivative ShareholdersLitig., 325 F.3d 795, 809-11 (7th Cir.
2003) (illustrating an instance in which the court, faced with a provision in Abbott's corporate charter that
exculpated the directors from liability for breach of the duty of care, found that the plaintiffs had adequately
alleged a breach of fiduciary duty of good faith as a result of the directors' failure to adequately respond to
regulatory violations).
100. Even a strong contractarian such as Professor Ribstein has apparently conceded that, under the right
circumstances, a court would not enforce an explicit waiver of fiduciary duties. In the context of arguing that
under UPA courts have enforced waivers of fiduciary duties and when they have set aside an agreement the
case actually involved a question of interpretation, not a question of public policy. In that context, he wrote:
"No case has had to confront a waiver that explicitly allowed an agent to completely forsake its fiduciary role.
It may be that a court in such a case would not allow the apparently authorized conduct." Ribstein, Fiduciary
Duties, supra n. 1, at 951. In that context, he may be saying that a court should not enforce the waiver,
although he does not quite go that far.
101. See e.g. Larry E. Ribstein, The Revised Uniform PartnershipAct: Not Ready for Prime Time, 49 Bus.
Law. 45, 54-61 (1993).
102. RUPA § 404(a) provides: "The only fiduciary duties a partner owes to the partnership and the other
partners are the duty of loyalty and the duty of care set forth in subsections (b) and (c)."
103. The common law may have characterized the duty of good faith as a fiduciary duty. See supra n. 33
and accompanying text.
104. RUPA § 404(f).
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(i)

the partnership agreement may identify specific types or categories of activities
that do not violate the duty of loyalty, ifnot manifestly unreasonable;or

(ii)

all of the partners or a number or percentage specified in the partnership
agreement may authorize or ratify, after full disclosure of all material facts, a
specific act or transaction that otherwise would violate the duty of loyalty;

(4) unreasonably reduce the duty of care under Section 404(c)... ;
(5) eliminate the obligation of good faith and fair dealing under Section 404(d), but the
partnership agreement may prescribe the standards by which the performance of the
obligation is to be measured, ifthe standardsare not manifestly unreasonable;...105
The Delaware statute poses no such limitations, expressly providing that a party's
fiduciary duties "may be expanded or restricted or eliminated by provisions in the
06
partnership agreement." 1
B.

Does RUPA Limit the ContractualFreedom in Comparison to UPA?

Professor Ribstein argues that RUPA has the effect of limiting the ability of the
parties to waive fiduciary duties or contract out of the fiduciary duty of care. 107 But are
his concerns legitimate? Professor Ribstein argues, for instance, that partners are
prevented from "letting a managing partner enter into contracts with the partnership on
behalf of the partner's management company" 108 and that this is unfortunate because the
limitation "precludes worthwhile contracts."' 109 Such a contract would, of course,
violate the duty of loyalty under § 404(b)(2), which requires that a partner refrain from
dealing with the partnership on behalf of a party having an interest adverse to the
partnership. The question then becomes whether, under § 103(b), it would be manifestly
unreasonable if the partnership agreement provided that such a contract would not
violate the partner's duty of loyalty. Suppose that the partnership agreement did so
provide, with no limitations on the consideration that would be payable by the
partnership under the management agreement. It seems that, under those circumstances,
a court is likely to hold either that such a provision is unenforceable because it is
manifestly unreasonable, or is enforceable only if it is fair to the partnership. But the
same result is likely under UPA as well, where a court would hold either that the
partnership agreement cannot absolve a party of a breach of fiduciary duty or that, if
unfair, the management agreement undercuts the purpose of the partnership agreement

105. Id. at § 103(b) (emphasis added). For comparable provisions, see ULLCA § 103; ULPA § 110.
106. Del. Code Ann. tit. 6, § 17-1101(d).
107. See e.g. Ribstein, supra n. 101.
108. Id. at58.
109. Id.("Mandatory fiduciary duties also are bad policy because they preclude worthwhile contracts.")
(footnote omitted).
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and therefore the managing partner lacked the authority to enter into it. Under either
UPA or RUPA, it is difficult to imagine a court upholding a management agreement
negotiated by the managing partner that is clearly unfair to the partnership. 110 This
leaves open a question of just what the term "manifestly unreasonable" means, the
subject of the next section.
C.

The Meaning of the Term "Manifestly Unreasonable"
1.

A Framework for Thinking about the Manifestly Unreasonable Standard

Criticism that the term is vague is certainly well taken, but in that regard, the term
is not unique in the law. Surely the same can be said of numerous other critical
standards in the law: "manifestly unjust," "unconscionable," etc. Moreover, the term
appears in several provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code (and elsewhere),' 1 ' and
the courts have thus applied the term for years. 112 The law is dependent on such
concepts to implement some underlying policy. The critical normative question, then, is
whether the underlying policy is justifiable. In the case of a limitation on waivers of
fiduciary duties, as demonstrated above, the chances are significant that courts will find
ways to hold a waiver unenforceable.
While there are relatively few cases that specifically address the meaning of
manifestly unreasonable as it appears in various statutes,1 13 case law does shed some
light on the term. For instance, one court cited, with approval, the definition of
"manifest" in Black's Law Dictionary:

110. Arguably, Delaware law would enforce such an agreement, but perhaps not, as more fully considered in
Part II above.
11. See U.C.C. §§ 1-201(28), 1-302(b), 2-309(3) (2003 amendments), 2A-103(u), 4-103(a), 8-402(c)(1),
8-403(c), 9-603(a).
112. Interestingly, while numerous cases apply the concept, they rarely explain why a provision is found
manifestly unreasonable. For a few examples of the many cases applying, without discussion, the manifestly
unreasonable standard, see Badgett Constr. & Dev. Co. v. Kan-Build, Inc., 102 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1104-06
(S.D. Iowa 2000); Mitchell Buick & Oldsmobile Sales, Inc. v. McHenry Savings Bank, 601 N.E.2d 1360
(Ill. App. 2d Div. 1992); Gornicki v. M&TBank, 617 N.Y.S.2d 448,450 (N.Y. Sup. 1994); see generally Elliot
M. Surkin, When Joint Venturers Can't Agree: The Buy-Sell Revisited pt. VII (ALI-ABA Course of Study
Materials, Modem Real Estate Transactions, Course No. SL004 July 27-30, 2005) (available at Westlaw,
ALI-ABA database and Lexis, CLE library, ALIABA file using search terms "SL004 & surkin"); Caryl B.
Welbom, Managing Investors Liability in the Real Property Venture pt. II(D)(1) (ALI-ABA Course of Study
Materials, Modem Real Estate Transactions, Course No. SL004 ALI-ABA 681, 702, July 27-30, 2005)
(available at Westlaw, ALI-ABA database and Lexis, CLE library, ALIABA file using search terms "SL004 &
welbom") (arguing the term manifestly unreasonable is likely to lead to confusion).
113. See e.g. Baron v. Strawbridge & Clothier, 646 F. Supp. 690, 698 (E.D. Pa. 1986) (holding "manifestly
unreasonable" means beyond "the outer limits of permissiveness"); F.B.I. Farms,Inc. v. Moore, 798 N.E.2d
440, 447 (Ind. 2003) (providing that in considering whether restrictions on the transfer of corporate stock were
manifestly unreasonable, the court listed several relevant factors); Roof Depot, Inc. v. Ohman, 638 N.W.2d 782,
785 (Minn. App. 2002) (same, applying Minnesota law); see generally Robert R. Keatinge, Ann Conaway
Anker & Paul L. Lion IllI,Internal Disputes and Break-Ups: Colorado, California,and Delaware (ALI-ABA
Course of Study Materials, Limited Liability Entities: 2005 New Developments in Limited Liability
Companies and Limited Liability Partnerships, Course No. VMF0317 March 17, 2005) (available at Westlaw,
ALI-ABA database and Lexis, CLE library, ALIABA file using search terms "vmf0317 & lion") (noting the
paucity of judicial authority).
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Evident to the senses, especially to the sight, obvious to the understanding, evident to the
mind, and not obscure or hidden, and is synonymous with open, clear, visible,
114
unmistakable, indubitable, indisputable, evident, and self-evident.

Another court made clear that the challenged provision must be considered in light of the
circumstances at the time of contract. 115 If the party challenging a waiver in a
partnership agreement or operating agreement is sophisticated, courts will likely impose
on that party a heavy burden of proof. Drawing on the standards for a directed verdict, a
waiver might be found manifestly unreasonable "only in the clearest of cases, where the
facts are undisputed and reasonable minds could draw but one" conclusion. 1 16 In this
regard, prior dealings between the parties and practices in the business in which the
entity is engaged would be important factors. 117 And, as indicated in a Fifth Circuit case
cited in a comment to RUPA § 103, where the parties are of equal bargaining power, a
waiver would rarely be denied enforcement. 118 Finally, it seems fair to observe, based
on cases in which waivers have been considered by the courts, 119 that the following
factors would be material to a court's determination as to whether a provision is
manifestly unreasonable:
a.

Did the Waiver Clearly and UnambiguouslyRelate to the
Conduct at Issue?

If a court is to set aside a contract provision, it should do so only if such a finding is
necessary to the result. As noted above, courts have often held waivers unenforceable
when the decision could have rested on other grounds. Under RUPA, courts will have to
be more disciplined, and if a contract provision is to be set aside, the court will have to
identify reasons why it is manifestly unreasonable. Faced with that imperative, courts
must be sure that that is indeed the issue that they face.

114. Black's Law Dictionary 962 (Bryan A. Garner ed., 6th ed., 1990) (cited with approval in Morgan
Buildings & Spas, Inc. v. Turn-Key Leasing, Ltd., 97 S.W.3d 871, 880 (Tex. App. 5th Dist. 2003)).
115. F.B.I. Farms, 798 N.E.2d at 444 (considering whether restrictions on the transfer of corporate stock
were manifestly unreasonable). Courts determining whether a commercial contact is unconscionable are also
instructed to consider such factors: "The basic test is whether, in the light of the general commercial
background and the commercial needs of the particular trade or case, the clauses involved are so one-sided as
to be unconscionable under the circumstances existing at the time of the making of the contract.". U.C.C.
§ 2-302 cmt. 1.
116. Bates v. Stagg, 404 P.2d 530, 531 (Colo. 1965) (noting a standard for directed verdict).
117. Rapp v. Dime Savings Bank of N.Y., 408 N.Y.S. 2d 540, 546 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dept. 1978) (holding
time restrictions imposed by bank on withdrawals not manifestly unreasonable because the "time restrictions
are fully in accord with general banking usage"); see also McCullough v. General Motors Corp., 577 F. Supp.
41, 47 (W.D. Tenn. 1982) (noting that "determination of these issues requires a careful consideration of the
purpose and effect of the time limitation, the commercial setting in which the contract was executed, the
reasonableness of the time limitation at the time of contracting"); U.C.C. § 1-302 cmt. 1 (2001) (recognizing
the importance of prior course of dealing and usage of trade in determining whether a provision is manifestly
unreasonable).
118. PPG Industries, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 919 F.2d 17, 19 (5th Cir. 1990); see e.g. Keatinge, Anker &
Lion 11l, supra n. 113, at 93 ("[The manifestly unreasonable standard] is intended to discourage overreaching
by a partner with superior bargaining power since the courts may refuse to enforce an overly broad exculpatory
clause.").
119. See generally Sarah Howard Jenkins, Preemption & Supplementation underRevised 1-103: The Role of
Common Law & Equity in the New UCC, 54 S.M.U. L. Rev. 495, 520-23 (2001) (collecting cases construing
the term "manifestly unreasonable" in the UCC).
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From an Ex Ante Perspective, was any Party Adversely
Affected by the Waiver?

In a general partnership, if each partner has the freedom to compete with the
partnership, no partner can complain that the waiver is unfair. On the other hand, if the
general partners in a limited partnership are freed from their duty of loyalty, the limited
partners are at risk and the waiver should be scrutinized. A waiver could nonetheless be
entirely reasonable if, as in Sonet, the facts provide some other protection for the limited
partners. Moreover, if the limited partners and the general partners are of equal
bargaining power, the burden on the limited partners to demonstrate that a waiver is
manifestly unreasonable should be great.
c.

Would Enforcement of the Waiver Damage the Partnershipin a
Way that the PartiesCould Not Have Anticipated When the
Waiver was Executed?

The importance of this factor might be illustrated in a partnership organized to,
say, enter into a master lease for a commercial office building in an urban area. The
partners would typically agree that they should be allowed to "compete," that is, invest in
or develop other properties that might compete for tenants with the partnership's
building. This is typically viewed as an acceptable risk. However, if some members of
the partnership were to bid against the partnership when the master lease came up for
renewal, the partnership might be damaged in a way that the partners did not anticipate
when they entered into the agreement. This is not the sort of competition that the parties
anticipated, and the waiver, if so interpreted, may be manifestly unreasonable.
Nevertheless, the waiver should be enforceable if evidence supports an interpretation that
this was consistent with the parties' ex ante intent.
d

Was the PartnershipClosely Held or More Widely Held?

Clearly, an agreement negotiated among a few parties is distinguishable from one
that is presented to numerous investors on a non-negotiable basis. In the latter case, the
agreement is akin to corporate articles of incorporation and will likely be viewed more
skeptically by the courts. The contents of articles of incorporation are defined and
limited by corporate statutes in a way that a partnership agreement or operating
agreement for a limited liability company is not. But to some extent that is because
corporate law contemplates a division between ownership and control that also describes
the relationship between investors in a quasi-public partnership or limited liability
company and the managers of the entity. 120 Indeed, in some cases the investors in these
entities will receive an offering memorandum and, some time later, a signature page for a
partnership or operating agreement without having seen, much less negotiated, the terms
of such an agreement. The point here is not that corporate fiduciary terms should be
imported into partnership or operating agreements, but rather that in light of the

120. See Frankel, supra n. 18, at 1253-66 (arguing for limitations on waivers of the fiduciary duties of
"public fiduciaries").
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similarities between quasi-public unincorporated business entities and corporations, it is
inevitable that courts will scrutinize fiduciary waivers in widely-held unincorporated
business entities.
2.

Reexamining Cases Upholding Waivers under UPA

Critics have suggested that RUPA is more restrictive than UPA in permitting the
parties to waive fiduciary duties in their partnership agreement. The implicit suggestion
of such critics is that courts will view waivers that are enforced in UPA partnership
agreements as manifestly unreasonable. Put differently, these critics seem to be arguing
that courts have been enforcing waivers that are manifestly unreasonable. This argument
seems somewhat implausible on its face, but is worthy of examination.
In his article criticizing RUPA, and speculating that it will change the way courts
view cases, Professor Hynes cites two cases that would come out differently under
RUPA, Singer v. Singer, which is discussed above, and Riviera Congress Associates v.
Yassky. 12 1 As to Singer, the question might be posed as follows: Is a provision in a
general partnership agreement among a limited number of equally sophisticated parties
manifestly unreasonable if construed to permit one or more partners to pursue a business
venture in which the partnership might have an interest, but is not competitive with the
business of the partnership? As properly posed, the answer a court would likely give
seems fairly predictable.
Indeed, under the circumstances, there was nothing
unreasonable about the agreement of the parties. Posing the issue in alternative
language, such as whether a waiver of the duty not to compete is manifestly
unreasonable, would misstate the case and disserve the goal of understanding its holding.
The broad waiver contained in the agreement, however, would as an abstract proposition
support an argument that the partners could actually compete with the partnership. But
the nature of the partnership business was such that competition was not a meaningful
problem, given the perfectly competitive market for oil and gas. This explains why the
partners agreed to such a broad waiver and why it is problematic to read the decision too
broadly.
Riviera Congress, the second case cited by Professor Hynes, is even less of a
problem under the manifestly unreasonable standard, as it arguably did not even involve
an express, forward-looking waiver. Rather, this was a case in which the defendants
formed a limited partnership for the purpose of acquiring certain real property and
leasing that property to an entity they controlled. This proposed self-dealing was fully
disclosed to the limited partners when the limited partnership was organized.
Subsequently, general partners consented to an assignment of the lease that released
them, in their capacity as tenants, from an obligation to the limited partnership. The
limited partners brought a derivative action seeking to recover the lost rent and claiming
that the release was invalid since it involved self-dealing.
The New York court rejected the self-dealing claim because disclosures in the
prospectus given to the limited partners to solicit their investment in the deal disclosed
that the limited partnership would be leasing the property to an entity controlled by the

121.

223 N.E.2d 876 (N.Y. 1966).
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general partners and that the lease could be assigned if the assignee assumed the
obligations under the lease. 122 In the partnership agreement, the limited partners
123
acknowledged receipt of the prospectus and represented that they were relying on it.
In other words, the limited partners could hardly complain of a transaction specifically
contemplated in the offering document. Rather, and significantly, the court noted that a
' 124
trial would determine whether the defendants acted "honestly and in good faith."
Thus, plaintiffs were not without a remedy if the defendants exercised their contractual
right to assign the property in bad faith. 125 However, and as the court conceded, there
was no justification to hold that the assignment itself was invalid.
Considering the application of RUPA to the facts of Riviera Congress raises two
questions: First, did the partnership agreement waive the general partners' duty of loyalty
and second, if so, was the waiver manifestly unreasonable? As to the first question, this
case may not have involved a forward-looking waiver. The partnership, after all, was
formed to enter into a self-dealing lease. While the limited partners were complaining of
the assignment of this lease, they might just as well have complained about the lease
itself. Consider, then, a claim by the limited partners brought immediately after
formation of the partnership seeking to enjoin the lease on the basis that it constitutes a
breach of the general partners' duty of loyalty. The claim is obviously frivolous, as was
the claim that consent to assignment involved impermissible self-dealing. Rather, with
respect to the initial lease, and the subsequent decision to consent to an assignment of the
lease, the question is whether the general partners exercised their discretion in good faith,
a limitation that RUPA wisely preserved. The issue in Riviera Congress might thus be
framed as follows: Is a limited partnership agreement that contemplates the lease of
partnership property to an entity controlled by the general partner manifestly
unreasonable? As in Singer, it would appear that the agreement is not unreasonable at
all, much less manifestly so.
3.

Lack of Alternatives

Professor Hynes has suggested that judicial review of fiduciary waivers be tested
by a standard of unconscionability, 126 arguing that such a standard will limit the
122. Id.at 877; see also Bassan v. Inv. Exch. Corp., 524 P.2d 233, 236 (Wash. 1974) ("Partners may include
in the partnership articles practically any agreement they wish and if the asserted self-dealing was actually
contemplated and specifically authorized with a method for determining, in advance, the amount of the profit it
would not, ipso facto, be impermissible and deemed wrongful." (citation omitted)).
123. Riviera Congress, 223 N.E. 2d at 877.
124. Id. at 880.
125. This issue, on remand, would have been difficult to resolve because the Court of Appeals gave no hint
as to how good faith would be measured under these circumstances. Presumably, if the defendant consented to
assignment solely to protect the assets of the assigning entity, and knowing that the assignee would be unable
to honor the lease, a claim of bad faith may be made out.
126. Hynes, FiduciaryDuties, supra n. 1, at 52-54; but see George W. Dent, Jr., Gap Fillers and Fiduciary
Duties in Strategic Alliances, 57 Bus. Law. 55, 72 (2001) ("If there is a difference between [the manifestly
unreasonable standard and the unconscionability standard] it is slight."). Oregon has substituted the concept of
unconscionability for the manifestly unreasonable standard. Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 67.015(2)(b)(A) (2005)
("[P]artnership agreement may identify specific types or categories of activities that do not violate the duty of
loyalty, if not unconscionable."). One court has drawn on unconscionability jurisprudence to decide whether a
provision is manifestly unreasonable, Oxford Resources Corp. v. Jenkins, 642 N.Y.S.2d 488 (N.Y. City
Civ. Ct. 1996), while several others have held that the manifestly unreasonable standard was independent of
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instances in which a partnership agreement is rendered unenforceable, resulting in
agreements that are more certain and reliable. Assuming that the goal is to provide some
opportunity for judicial review of questionable fiduciary waivers, the unconscionability
standard is not appropriate. As an initial matter, substituting an unconscionability
standard for a manifestly unreasonable standard would have the same legal effect as a
statutory provision that allowed an elimination of the duty of loyalty, because a court
will not enforce an unconscionable contract. 127 The common law has adopted the notion
that unconscionable contracts are unenforceable, and drafters of a partnership statute
would have to provide that fiduciary waivers are enforceable even if unconscionable to
change that common law result. Such a statute would not be introduced, much less
enacted, so that expressly providing for a review based on unconscionability adds
nothing to a statute.
Second, the jurisprudence that has developed under the unconscionability standard
does not seem appropriate because of the generally accepted requirement that a
complaining party prove procedural unconscionability as well as substantive
unconscionability. To satisfy procedural unconscionability, a plaintiff must demonstrate
that he or she lacked "meaningful choice," 128 which, in the context of a financial
investment, will be highly problematic. Presumably, an investor has a nearly limitless
number of alternative investment vehicles. The fact, however, that the investor had other
alternatives should not mean that the waiver is unassailable. A party to a partnership
agreement has different expectations than, say, a consumer purchasing a product or
service from a merchant. In the consumer transaction, the consumer knows that he or
she is dealing at arm's length and, to a large extent, the principle of caveat emptor should
limit the ability of the consumer to challenge the terms of the transaction. By contrast, a
person entering into a partnership agreement has the expectation of entering into a longer
term relationship with co-partners, all of whom share a common profit-making goal. In
such a relationship, a party may be more focused on the economic aspects of the
partnership than on provisions relating to competition, disclosure, and self-dealing.
Although this view is somewhat paternalistic, courts are likely to be sympathetic to an
investor who was approached as a potential partner and, understandably, trusted the
129
promoter, even if no formal fiduciary duty existed between the parties at the time.
Any statutory standard of judicial review that does not contemplate this sympathy will
surely be abused.

unconscionability. See Fundacion Museo De Arte Contemporeneo De Caracas-SofiaImber v. CBI-TDB Union
Bancaire Privee, 996 F. Supp. 277 (S.D.N.Y. 1998), aftid, 160 F.3d 146 (2d Cir. 1998) (UCC Article 4 case);
Hart Engineering Co. v. FMC Corp., 593 F. Supp. 1471, 1480 (D.R.I. 1984) (In a claim related to a goods
transaction, the court held that the manifestly unreasonable standard cannot be invalidated by the doctrine of
unconscionability.); Loucks v. New Holland Mfg., Inc., 1993 WL 152288 (Minn. App. May 11, 1993)
(warranty provision); see generally Jenkins, supra n. 119, at 516.
127. Restatement (Second)of Contracts § 208.
128. Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965); see generally Arthur
Allen Leff, Unconscionability and the Code-The Emperor's New Clause, 115 U. Pa. L. Rev. 485 (1967)
(suggesting that unconscionability consists of procedural and substantive aspects).
129. UPA § 21 requires a partner to account for any profit made in formation of the partnership. While
RUPA § 404 dropped this concept, courts may be inclined to recognize a duty to account for profits earned in
the formation of the partnership, if the complaining partner can demonstrate that a relationship of trust and
confidence was established during the formation of the partnership.
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Finally, the established jurisprudence under the unconscionability standard is
ill-suited to review fiduciary waivers. 130 Some waivers that would not pass muster in a
consumer context likely should be acceptable in the context of a partnership. For
instance, judicial review of a waiver of the duty of care in the context of medical services
has little relevance to an identical waiver in a financial partnership. On the other hand,
waivers of the duty of loyalty in an employment context may be enforceable when a
similar waiver in the partnership context may be manifestly unreasonable. The nature of
the relationship of the parties and their reasonable expectations should play a more
important role in examining fiduciary waivers in partnership agreements than in other
settings.
IV.

THE ACADEMIC DEBATE: CONTRACTARIANS V. FIDUCIARIANS

The debate between the contractarians and fiduciarians is set forth in several
well-written articles 13 1 and it would serve little purpose to recount those debates in any
detail. A brief review of the fundamental fault lines of the debate is, however,
worthwhile in order to place the suggestion of this article in the context of that debate.
Generally, contractarians and fiduciarians tend to focus on history, the role of bargaining,
and economic efficiency.
A.

History

The historical importance of fiduciary duties in partnerships does not mean, of
course, that fiduciary duties must be mandatory in contemporary unincorporated business
entities. But the historical fact does mean that investors, particularly limited partners and
limited liability company members in a manager-managed limited liability company,
may well have an expectation that those managing the enterprise are their fiduciaries.
While this is an empirical assertion, it seems at least plausible, if not compelling.
Indeed, the common law origins of fiduciary duties rest on an intuition about what
people expect, and there is no reason to believe that those expectations have changed
over time. More importantly, courts may view such managers as presumptive
fiduciaries. These expectations influence judicial decisions and ought to be considered
by statutory drafters as well.
One answer to the historical argument is that unincorporated business entities have
always been contractual in nature, with courts honoring the parties' agreement to waive
common law fiduciary duties. Thus, one might argue, fiduciary duties have never been
mandatory and common law duties have been subject to contractual modification. This
argument, however, both understates the common law influence on fiduciary duties and
overstates the role of private ordering. As to the former, Part II above demonstrates that
the common law commitment to recognizing fiduciary duties is so well-ingrained that it
amounts to a "mandatory" provision. Indeed, the drafters of UPA felt no need to include
130. See Ribstein, FiduciaryDuty Contracts,supra n. 1, at 567 (1997) ("[A]n unconscionability standard has

the virtue of integrating enforceability of fiduciary duty waivers into the general law of contracts. For this
reason, unconscionability may be too narrow a basis of invalidation to satisfy anticontractarians." (footnote
omitted)).

131. See supra n. I and accompanying text.
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those fiduciary duties in the uniform Act. As the ability to contractually modify these
duties, this article demonstrates the significant limitations placed on this freedom by the
courts.
B.

Lack of Bargaining

Unincorporated business entities can be closely held, with the terms of the
partnership or operating agreement negotiated by the parties in an arm's length
negotiation, or the entity may be widely, if not publicly, held. In this section, I consider
only the latter, such as operating or partnership agreements of real estate syndicators.
Such agreements bear similarities to corporate articles of incorporation, which investors
typically do not negotiate.
Contractarians argue that corporate investors are not in need of any special
protection and that the investment decision that they face is entirely different from that of
a consumer faced with an adhesion contract. Corporate investors have an array of
investment opportunities, including corporations with a broad range of governance and
capital structures, unincorporated business entities with a nearly infinite variety of terms,
mutual and exchange-traded funds, certificates of deposits and bank savings accounts,
etc. Each of these investment opportunities competes within categories and across
categories for investor dollars. As one critic has said, "[t]his wide range of choices
among 'adhesion' contracts means, in effect, that there is no such thing as an adhesion
13 2
contract."
Contractarians necessarily assume a degree of sophistication among investors in
corporations and unincorporated business entities that may not be warranted.
Particularly with respect to unincorporated business entities, the relevant operating or
partnership agreement may be very long and complex. Terms that relate to fiduciary
duties may not be collected in one section; instead, terms that relate to fiduciary duties
may appear in various sections dealing with management, distributions, repurchase of
units, etc. Contractarians respond that this does not matter, as voluntary contracting is
presumptively efficient, and the contract should therefore be enforced. That may or may
not be the case, but it is irrelevant. The real question is not whether a court should
enforce any particular waiver, but whether it will. If a court will not, then it is fair to ask
whether statutory drafters should anticipate this judicial response. If, in fact, courts
employ covert tools to avoid enforcement of fiduciary duty waivers, then such contracts
cannot efficiently allocate risks among the parties. Instead, it may be more efficient if
the statute, against which these agreements are drafted, anticipated the likely judicial
response.
C.

Efficient Mandatory Rules

The idea that any voluntary agreement reached between two competent, fully
informed parties with roughly equal bargaining power should be enforced because it is
economically efficient to do so is relatively uncontroversial. When the promoter of an

132. Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, Opting Out of Fiduciary Duties: A Response to the
Anti-Contractarians,65 Wash. L. Rev. 1, 13 (1990).
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unincorporated business entity-seeks consent from the investor/partner or member, one
or more of these elements may be lacking. The investor may not, in fact, be fully
informed or sufficiently sophisticated; or the investor may not be in a position to bargain
with the promoter. Of course, these factors, standing alone or in the aggregate, ought not
to be sufficient to set aside a waiver or any other term of the relevant agreement. If they
were, a market economy would grind to a halt, or at least slow down markedly.
Investors would face fewer investment opportunities, and those available may not
provide the risk/reward ratio that many investors seek. If the enforceability of a waiver
is not assured-and in most jurisdictions it is not-then the promoter and the
sophisticated investors cannot accurately price a proposed deal. In this environment
some mandatory rules may prove to be more efficient than voluntary contracting.
Indeed, mandatory rules may be efficient. For instance, some commentators have
argued (persuasively, in my view) that corporate management should be passive when
faced with a hostile takeover. 1 33 Such a policy would enhance, and make more efficient,
the market for corporate control. This, of course, conflates the idea of the efficiency that
arises from voluntary bargaining with another sort of market efficiency. Under the
former, shareholders may well agree to exchange lower executive compensation for
greater flexibility on management's part to resist a hostile takeover. Even if this lowered
the value of the shareholders' stockholdings, it is unassailable from a contractarian
perspective, as the parties to the contract may value the resulting bargain greater than any
other bargain. From society's perspective, perhaps this is less than ideal and an
appropriate opportunity for mandatory rules. While, strictly speaking, the hypothetical
bargain described here does not give rise to externalities, society as a whole may have a
legitimate interest in maintaining an efficient market for corporate control.
This concept carries over to limitations on waivers. An investor may well be
willing to waive the promoter's duty of loyalty-freely permitting competition, for
instance-in exchange for a lower fee. But if there were doubts about the enforceability
of the waiver, the promoter may value the waiver lower than he otherwise would. The
uncertainty is a cost that the investor will bear, with no corresponding benefit if the
investor would not challenge competition by the promoter consistent with their
agreement. Thus, a mandatory rule that limits waivers removes uncertainty (or at least
reduces uncertainty), giving the parties greater certainty in their bargain. This redounds
to the market as a whole, rather than any particular transaction, as certainty is a good
shared by all participants. Indeed, under this analysis one of the important arguments of
contractarians-"[that] parties should be able to opt out of fiduciary duties to avoid
costly unpredictability" 134 that results from judicially imposed mandatory rules-is
stood on its head. By statutorily specifying the limits of a waiver, somewhat less
unpredictability is provided.

133. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The ProperRole of a Target's Management in Responding
to a Tender Offer, 94 Harv. L. Rev. 1161 (1981).
134. Butler & Ribstein, supra n. 132, at 43 (footnote omitted).
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Moreover, mandatory fiduciary duties or limitations on waivers provide a check on
agency costs that are not otherwise policed. 135 By assumption, there is no public market
for the investments described here, so the disciplining effect of the market for
"corporate" control is absent. While managers may value reputational effects, it is
unclear, especially with respect to the promoters of unincorporated business entities, how
powerful this effect is.
V.

CONCLUSION

Critics of the manifestly unreasonable standard decry its uncertainty and
ambiguity. One critic wrote that the term is "largely undefined in existing law, nebulous,
and unworkable in practice."' 136 These criticisms are well taken; it is indeed uncertain,
ambiguous, nebulous, and many other adjectives that suggest lack of clearly defined
limits. The term may, however, prove workable in practice. One might object to any
standard of judicial review on the basis of its uncertainty, but that is the nature of judicial
review. Once one decides that there is a role for the courts to play, the purpose of the
articulated standard is to provide some guidance for consistent decision making by the
courts. The manifestly unreasonable standard has the potential to do that as well as any
standard in private law. The legislatures adopting this standard have sent an
unmistakable message to the courts-the agreement of the parties is to be given
considerable, but not complete, deference. Agreements should be set aside only in
extreme cases, where the unreasonableness of the agreement is manifest. Naturally, it
will take some time for a body of precedent to develop, but other standards, such as a
simple unreasonable standard or an unconscionability standard, would not achieve what
the legislature sought to achieve.
The suggestion set forth in this article, supporting a statutory limitation on waivers
of fiduciary duties, is informed by the realities of the judicial system. When faced with
an obvious injustice that would result from enforcement of a fiduciary waiver, courts will
find a way around the provision. It may be that they should not, but they will. It is not
enough for a legislature to provide, as the Delaware legislature has, that it is the policy of
its Act "to give maximum effect to the principle of freedom of contract," because such a
provision does not speak to the difficult cases that courts face. "Freedom of contract"
presumably exists even in the absence of a statutory provision that extols its importance.
Courts that have developed the common law concepts of unconscionability and the
unenforceability of certain adhesion contracts did so in the shadow of a public policy
favoring freedom of contract. The real question for statutory drafters is whether they
prefer judicially-developed limits on the freedom of contract, or a legislatively-derived
solution. This article argues for the latter.

135. In addition, the existence of judicial relief for fiduciary breaches may encourage investment.
See Frankel, supra n. 18, at 1276 ("Although [limiting the ability of parties to waive fiduciary duties may]
seem paternalistic, they can be justified by concerns that, 'once badly burned,' entrustors will refrain from
entering into fiduciary relationships, to the great detriment of society as a whole.").
136. Callison, supra n. 1, at 158 (footnote omitted).

